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Abstract 
 The Soviet Union of the 1930s was marked by fearmongering, denunciations, and a series 
of show trials that rocked the Communist Party. The Great Terror started officially in late 1934 
and continued until 1938, entangling millions within its web of imprisonment, forced labor, and 
executions. The general consensus has been that the Terror was a result of government influence 
and citizens’ actions. A lot of the research done on this era has focused on why the average 
citizen would willingly participate in the government’s reign of terror. By examining a series of 
memoirs written during and about this time and official speeches and publications from high-
ranking Party members, this paper will show that the promised utopia was not enough to prevent 
discontent and the Soviet government turned to terror to consolidate its power further. In an 
attempt to fight the alleged class enemies within the Soviet society or to prevent themselves from 
being implicated, citizens wrote denunciations against family members, neighbors, bosses, etc. 
Doing so spread the purge into factories and small towns. By looking into the role of 
denunciations, in the Terror, this paper sheds light on the mechanisms of other campaigns of 
fear.  
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On December 1, 1934, Sergei Mironovich Kirov, the head of the Leningrad Communist 
Party, died under suspicious circumstances.1 Following the death of Kirov within the Smolny 
Institute, which served as the local party headquarters, Josef Stalin announced this death to the 
public and declared Kirov’s assassination the work of double-dealers, or traitor. Stalin’s 
publication in the Soviet magazine Pravda spoke positively of Kirov’s work, belying the 
tensions within the Communist Party, and described the terrible fate that had befallen Kirov. “A 
man who has given all his brilliant life to the cause of the working class, to the cause of 
Communism, to the cause of the liberation of humanity, is dead, victim of the enemy.”2 In using 
such strong language against the supposed perpetrators, Stalin emphasized the problem of 
enemies within the Soviet Union and fostered fear within the people.  
While the circumstances of this assassination are still up for debate, its influence on the 
Purges that followed has never been questioned. This incident was used as justification for what 
has been called the Great Terror. Stalin and other party officials exploited this fear of enemies 
and violence and set about on an operation to purify the Soviet Union of its perceived 
imperfections and antagonists. In the aftermath, anyone considered a political enemy, as vague as 
that term was, was targeted by the NKVD, the Soviet secret police. The number of those affected 
by the Terror are difficult to pin down, disputed in almost every facet. “The estimates range from 
a few million to well over 20 million victims. There is relative consensus that in the years 1930-
1956, between 17 and 18 million were sentenced to detention in prisons, colonies, and camps.”3 
                                                      
1 Wendy Z. Goldman, Inventing the Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in Stalin’s Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 1-2.  
2 J.V. Stalin., "The Death of Kirov," Marxist Internet Archive, 2008, accessed February 2, 2019, 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1934/12/01.htm. 
3 Nanci Adler, “Enduring Repression: Narratives of Loyalty to the Party Before, During and After the Gulag,” 
Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 2 (March 2010): 215. 
Griffin 6 
Until 1938, officials, party members, industrial leaders, average workers, peasants, etc. were 
labelled spies and saboteurs in the ensuing chaos. 
The Great Terror of the 1930s rocked the Soviet Union into mass hysteria. This period 
was marked by arrests, forced labor, torturous interrogations, and executions. Fueled by the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the show trials that popped up around the 
nation, the ordinary citizen was swept up into a campaign bigger than themselves but defined by 
their involvement. The Party, and the government that implemented its ideology, were 
responsible for creating the environment where denunciations, or communication between 
citizens and a higher authority that contains accusations against other citizens with the intent of 
punishment, thrived. Through enforcing the Party line and fostering mass hysteria through 
propaganda and inflammatory speeches and official publications, the government was able to 
indoctrinate the citizenry into the Party and subdue the rising tensions within society. This 
process of total indoctrination only became more rampant, a result of the Party realizing that 
their promised utopia did not match with the current state of the Soviet Union, creating a society 
based on fear and control and prompting denunciations and the Terror.  
The real beginning of the Great Terror started before the 1930s with precedents set during 
the collectivization campaigns, dekulakization campaigns against prosperous peasants, the 
Bolshevik consolidation of power, and national campaigns against foreigners, all done by Stalin 
to amass power and enforce his will. Industrialization and modernization were starting to be 
achieved, though only on a limited scale, and many citizens became disillusioned with the 
communist system. Stalin, aware of the tensions mounting in cities and in the countryside, 
implemented terror to reign in the people and further indoctrination into the Communist Party. In 
the ensuing chaos, many started to exploit and project their impurities onto those around them, 
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perpetuating the categorization of people with new accusations and broadening the pool of 
victims. This indoctrination into Party ideology and crushing of any opposition created an 
important moment in Soviet history.  
While there has been much debate on the source of the Great Terror, a general consensus 
has been reached: a mix of policy and influence from the party, the government it controlled, and 
compliance from the citizens. The government was culpable for its contribution in shaping the 
political climate, for following and enforcing party doctrine. By creating a sense of denounce or 
be denounced, the Party started a wave of fear and a process of guilt by association that 
encompassed everyone within the Soviet Union. When everyone was a target, including high-
ranking members of the Party itself, drastic measures were taken and normalized. This 
culpability, however, did not absolve citizens of their involvement. The average citizen was 
responsible for their actions during the Purges. This was not limited to writing denunciations, but 
also the passive acceptance of the Terror and the promotion of Soviet ideals. Families and 
friendships were torn apart with the up and down motion of denunciation, the sending up of 
letters to higher authorities and the heavy-handed response sent down in return, and without 
resistance, the ripple effect was able to widen indefinitely.4 Why did the Great Terror happen? 
When does the responsibility for its spread switch from the Party to the average citizen? Who 
sustained it and what factors in society allowed it to flourish?  
My paper draws on English translations of memoirs by those affected and involved, 
including Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Nadezhda Mandelstam, Victor Andreevich Kravchenko, 
Anna Larina, and Evgenia Ginzburg. It also uses speeches delivered by Soviet leaders and other 
official material, i.e. propaganda and the Penal Code of the R.S.F.S.R, specifically Article 58. 
                                                      
4 Goldman, Inventing, 299.  
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Besides these primary sources, secondary sources provide an interesting discussion of the 
historical precedents of denunciation and the willingness of the people to follow Party doctrine. I 
have been able to use the authors’ archival research and their analysis of primary documents to 
shape my overall picture of the era. Important authors include: Sheila Fitzpatrick, who writes on 
the history of denunciation around the world with a focus on Russia; Zbigniew Brzezinski, a 
Polish-American diplomat and political scientist who writes about terror within totalitarian 
regimes; and Jochen Hellbeck and Igal Halfin, who both focus on the issues of individuality and 
diaries during Stalinism. They all focus on different aspects of Soviet life in this time and have 
been invaluable in my investigation into this topic.  
Within the memoirs, I was looking for reflections on the Terror. How did the author cope 
emotionally with the Terror, and how did their mindset change over the period? What did they 
believe, during or after the Terror, led citizens to denounce others? Because it is nearly 
impossible to figure out an individual’s motives for writing their denunciation letter, I had to 
look for broader themes within the memoirs, including desperation, despair, grief, betrayal, etc. I 
then placed their experiences into the broader history of the time period shown in the speeches 
and official publications issued by the government and party. My secondary sources provided 
context and raw data for what the authors were experiencing and show the backdrop of citizen’s 
actions and beliefs.  
 My paper will be split into five main sections dealing with Party’s beliefs, the state’s 
influence, and the citizens’ responses. The first section will cover the background of the Party 
and the Soviet Union. The second will deal with the ideology of the Soviet self, detailing purity, 
diaries and autobiographies, literary campaigns, loyalty to the Party, replacement of religion, and 
national campaigns as precedents. This is important to show the pressures from the government 
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on the general populace and explain why people gave into these pressures. The third section will 
deal with letter-writing culture overall, which will show the tradition of communication between 
the people and the government, including denunciations. The fourth section is about the fear-
mongering during the Purge, detailing indoctrination, enemies, the end of personal relationships, 
and the Gulag. Most of these aspects, excluding mass hysteria and the loss of self, have histories 
in the Tsarist era.5 While these topics seem disconnected from the Purge, all contributed to the 
environment where denunciations thrived and help to explain why some heeded this call. By 
analyzing memoirs and other primary sources, I hope to show the options people had during this 
era, their feelings, why they believed or continue to believe in the Party during and after the 
Terror, and the dissonance many developed from this epoch. The last section will deal with the 
aftermath of the Terror, the continued fear of persecution, and the petition process for 
rehabilitation and reinstatement into the CPSU.  
Background 
 The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a pervasive and powerful force that 
controlled the government and influenced the people in every almost aspect of their lives. Before 
Stalin, however, the Party used different methods to gain and keep power. By using World War I 
and the following Civil War to foster discontent and create extremists, the Party was successful 
in gaining, maintaining, and exerting its power. They also were able to point to Russia’s 
backwardness as a problem of imperialism and revamp society based around modernization and 
industrialization.6 When the Civil War ended and the Party was finally sure of its survival, 
                                                      
5 Solzhenitsyn, 132, 298, 319. 
6 J. V. Stalin, "A Year of Great Change: On the Occasion of the Twelfth Anniversary of the October Revolution," 
Marxist Internet Archive, 2008, accessed May 9, 2019, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/ 
1929/11/03.htm. 
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officials were able to change their tactics. During the Terror, the Party was able to consolidate 
control through fear and exploitation of crises and prejudices. With this, and by banning all other 
political parties, the Communist Party became the only power within the Soviet Union for over 
half a century. 
The government imposed by the CPSU can be described as totalitarian. Through 
eliminating all other ideologies and dissenting opinions, the Communists believed they were able 
to set themselves up as the future of mankind. From the Cold War perspective of Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, the Communists wanted to undo everything from the Tsarist era, including basic 
aspects of society: “Their ideology,” Brzezinski wrote, “provides a total critique of the 
antecedent form of societal organization and a prescription for a complete reconstruction of 
society and man.”7 The Party believed they could take any action necessary to consolidate and 
keep power, including through the use of terror. Members of society, within and outside the 
Party, were swept up into the ideology and its required actions. Stalin was not the first general 
secretary to undertake this process. Lenin also used terror and coercion to transform the 
revolutionary movement into a disciplined government, though not to the extent that Stalin did 
after Lenin’s death in 1924.8  
 The Russia at the beginning of the early communist movement, the late early 1900s until 
1922, was plagued by widespread discontent from World War I, food and goods shortages, and 
the delayed then rapid industrialization, showcased when compared to their neighbors and 
subsequent enemies throughout Europe. Vladimir Lenin was able to take these problems and 
formulate them into a revolutionary movement centered around modernization. With this, he was 
                                                      
7 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Nature of the Soviet System." Slavic Review 20, no. 3 (October 1961): 353. 
8 Ibid., 354. 
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able to overthrow the government and gain followers throughout the empire. During the Civil 
War, those with connections to the past regime were purged or converted to Marxism, forcibly.9 
After the Civil War, the Party set out to remove all other aspects of society, including religion 
and anything related to the Tsarist era.10 Through modernization and the spread of communist 
ideology, the Party was able to recreate the Russian Empire into the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and establish itself as the first communist country in 1922.  
 The late 1920s into the early 1930s was the time of the Five Year Plans introducing 
collectivization, dekulakization, and industrialization. In 1928, the First Five Year Plan was 
issued, calling for rapid industrialization on a scale never seen before.11 The Soviet Union was 
successful, but at the cost of millions of lives. The Second Five Year Plan was issued in 1933, 
calling for collectivization and dekulakization aimed at removing private property in the 
countryside and ridding the nation of petite bourgeoisie, the prosperous peasants who were cast 
as exploiters. Many were forced from the countryside into cities as displaced citizens or forced to 
work on communes, named kolkhozes.12 Industrialization was fueled by urbanization, continuing 
modernization, and became a focal point in propaganda. “The organizational compulsion of the 
party for ideology-action thus becomes the source and the means of modernization, thereby 
strengthening the party’s social legitimization.”13 This removal of the private economy and quest 
for modernization created a vacuum the Party could fill, instilling zeal in its members and 
converting bystanders into loyal communists.  
                                                      
9 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5.  
10 Brzezinski, 352.  
11 Lewis Siegelbaum, "Year of Great Change," Seventeen Moments in Soviet History, 2002, accessed May 9, 2019, 
http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1929-2/year-of-great-change/. 
12 Wendy Z. Goldman, "Twin Pyramids–Perpetrators and Victims." Slavic Review 72, no. 01 (Spring 2013): 26.  
13 Brzezinski, 360.  
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 However, the 1920s and 1930s were not only filled with problems for the average citizen, 
whether in the city or the countryside. After Lenin’s death in early 1924, the Party faced 
leadership conflicts. Originally Stalin fought against Leon Trotsky to become the next general 
secretary until his victory that same year, clinched by Trotsky’s flight from the country in 1936. 
After Stalin officially came to power, he still dealt with the issue of opposition.14 In the 
following years, he would purge, remove from the Communist Party, anyone he believed would 
oppose him, including Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and Nikolai Bukharin. All three, and 
many others purged, were leading members of the Communist Party and part of the Bolsheviks 
long before the USSR was established. They all met their deaths in the show trials that marked 
the Terror and became some of the most publicized victims of the era. 
 While so-called Trotskyites, believers of Trotsky’s theory of Marxism, and enemies were 
being publicly tried for their crimes in Moscow, people around the nation were called to 
denounce enemies and double-dealers. Members of the party were especially sensitive to this but 
the average citizen was also recruited into this endeavor. The Party was able to maintain 
conformity through indoctrination and to maintain order through terror.15 Terror, combined with 
improvements in industry and modernization caused many to join into the Party ranks and others 
to tacitly support the Party. These circumstances provide the background for what became the 
Terror and the history of the Soviet Union through the 1930s. People were conditioned to accept 
the Party and its ideology from the onset of the Bolshevik regime and this only continued 
through Stalin’s regime.  
 
                                                      
14 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 7.  
15 Nanci Adler, “Enduring Repression: Narratives of Loyalty to the Party Before, During and After the Gulag,” 
Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 2 (March 2010): 211.  
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The Party 
Ideology and Ideological Action 
Ideology served as a mode of control in the Soviet Union and the image it presented to 
the citizens shows why some were willing to engage in denunciatory practices. The Stalinist 
period was defined by the destruction of Tsarist and early Bolshevik frameworks and the 
beginning of an outline for control that would span until 1953.16 Stalin had to deal with 
widespread discontent stemming from collectivization, the move from private farming to 
communal farming, usually by force, and industrialization that arose during this era.17 While 
consciousness, awareness of one’s place in the world, i.e. proletariat or bourgeois, is seen as a 
basic tenet of Communism, it proved difficult in keeping the masses subjugated. Nevertheless, 
consciousness remained vital to the party line. As a result, a maxim of Lenin’s was put into 
effect: “Bring order or implement terror.”18 The Communist Party marked their ideology as one 
of action and struggle, and how one dealt with this struggle was the key to gaining the 
revolutionary consciousness necessary to further the Soviet Union to its utopian end.19  
 To implement their ideal world, the Soviets developed the idea of the New Man. The 
ideal of the New Soviet Man was pervasive and changed according to current party goals. The 
party, under the strict hand of Stalin, promoted this new man and an era of transparency. The 
new man was to epitomize the revolutionary spirit of the Bolsheviks and help to bring an 
international communist state into being.20 They were to transform themselves into this ideal 
                                                      
16 Brzezinski, 354.  
17 Ibid., 352.  
18 Nanci , 214.  
19 Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2006), 26-32.  
20 Ibid., 29.  
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while maintaining complete openness and loyalty to the state.21 They were to be completely and 
wholly dedicated to the Soviet system and its future. A level of ideological purity was required, 
forcing many to overcome and disassociate with their family’s history if they wanted to become 
a party member.22 This proved difficult after twenty years marked by revolutions in 1917, a civil 
war from 1917 to 1922, and a short stint under the New Economic Policy in 1921, where 
capitalism was briefly reestablished. Everyone was tainted in some way by the association to the 
past and this made the culture of denunciations viable. When everyone has something that makes 
them an enemy in the eyes of the Party, denunciations become easier to write and harder to 
dodge.  
 Another important aspect for membership within the Party was the writing and constant 
editing of an autobiography, which serves as a vital source for understanding the Stalinist period 
from a citizen’s perspective. While overall there was a push for the removal of the individual 
self, which would cause tensions discussed later, the autobiography served to establish a person 
in their journey to self-realization under the Communist system. These autobiographies served as 
a vital part within Soviet culture, being a part of the interviewing process for university or 
employment opportunities and demanded at almost every stage in life. During the Purge, these 
autobiographies were frequently reviewed by their authors and those around them, and any fault 
could mean expulsion from the Party. “The Communist’s subjective essence, the strength or 
weakness of his character, came to the fore in his ‘autobiography,’ which he recited to his party 
comrades in the climatic dramatic moment of the purge process.”23 These autobiographies 
showed a person’s struggles, successes, and, even, their contribution to the Revolutions of 1917, 
                                                      
21 Ibid., 6.  
22 Goldman, Inventing, 16-17.  
23 Hellbeck, Revolution, 26.  
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no matter how small. By forcing many to write themselves into history, many joined the CPSU 
in their missions implicitly, even without official party membership. 
 The Communist Party portrayed themselves as, “the bearer of light whose mission was to 
bring education and technology to Russia’s ‘dark’ masses.”24 Under this guise, loyalty to the 
Party was noble, and many party members wanted to be part of the wonderful future that was 
promised to them. However, loyalty had a cost. When the state officially warned its people about 
internal enemies, many sprang to the defense of the nation.25 It was one’s patriotic duty to report 
suspicious activity, no matter the relationship between the denouncer and denounced. As 
tensions escalated, people started to show their loyalty by publicly interrogating others, 
especially during Party meetings in factories.26 Without this public display, one’s loyalty could 
be considered questionable and, in the era of denunciations, a fate marked by torturous 
interrogations, and forced labor was a reality for millions of Soviets. This loyalty can also be 
used to explain the multitude of rehabilitation letters filed after the death of Stalin in 1953 by 
those denounced and stripped of their party membership.27  
 In the Stalinist era starting in 1928, legal specialists determined that a suitable socialist 
society had been achieved.28 This was determined by the successes in Soviet Russia’s 
industrialization campaigns up to this point and the fight against capitalism seen in the cities and 
countryside.29 As a result, people were no longer able to excuse anti-communist thoughts or 
actions on Russia’s past capitalistic history and the New Economic Policy was replaced with a 
planned economy. Suddenly, the average citizen was fully culpable compared to the leniency of 
                                                      
24 Hellbeck, Revolution, 21.  
25 Goldman, Inventing, 300-301.  
26 Ibid., 21.  
27 Adler, 212-216.  
28 Hellbeck, Revolution, 34.  
29 J. V. Stalin, "A Year of Great Change.” 
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the 1920s. The Soviet Union was attempting to create, “a social body defined in terms of 
absolute purity of spirit.”30 In this drive to eliminate any individual or group that did not conform 
to the Soviet system, the government encouraged denunciations and people accepted this call.31 
Simultaneously, many realized that any ideologically impure thought or history could be 
exploited, only exacerbating the fear and confusion.32 Everyone was vulnerable and this 
realization further divided the people within the country, creating a perfect storm for what 
became known as the Great Terror.  
Autobiographies and Diaries 
“And here we are! The Kirov wave from Leningrad has begun…an ‘accelerated’ judicial 
procedure was introduced… And there was no right of appeal. It is also believed that one quarter 
of Leningrad was purged – cleaned out – in 1934-1935.”33 This was said by Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn, a victim of the Gulag system who spent eight years in a forced labor camp then his 
life in exile. He was an outspoken critic of the Soviet Union. His memoir, The Gulag 
Archipelago, has become the foremost piece of literature on the Terror and the Soviet penal 
system. His memoir and various other writings he kept throughout his imprisonment, and used 
against him, are examples of the larger tradition of diary keeping, which, as mentioned earlier, 
was utilized by the Party as a proof of loyalty.34  
 For some, a diary was not worth the risk. “When a person was arrested—and that could 
happen to anyone at any time in Stalin’s Russia—the first thing to be taken was his or her diary, 
                                                      
30 Ibid., 35.  
31 Goldman, Inventing, 5.  
32 Ibid., 16-17.  
33 Aleksandr Isaevich Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, 
trans. Thomas P. Whitney, Vol. 1, (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 58.  
34 Ibid., 164-165. 
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which would be scrutinized by the police for evidence of ‘anti-Soviet’ thoughts.”35 For others, 
however, a diary allowed the ability to analyze their situation and work through problems they 
had with Communism without fully abandoning the Party, hopefully without the Party’s 
knowledge.36 For those who had dedicated many years of their lives to the Party and were now 
faced with fears of denunciation or the denunciation of someone close, a diary proves crucial. 
The Party, for some, was the most important thing in their lives, and in a society where any 
fleeting thought can be criminalized, a diary provided an outlet. However, diaries, as noted 
above, held multiple risks and many have not survived the Terror.  
 Both the diary and autobiography were possible due to campaigns from the CPSU and the 
government to increase literacy and standardize education. This also allowed for a greater class 
consciousness. In order to achieve the widespread political understanding a Communist society 
required, elementary level reading and writing skills were necessary. While education would 
remain an important facet of Soviet life, originally this was done to instill the revolutionary 
consciousness that marked the ideal man. Interestingly, the method of teaching that would 
characterize Soviet schools developed in this era emphasized individual thought and championed 
intellect.37 This is often used as a justification for the actions of the Communist Party and the 
Soviet government, becoming an example of good that arose during the early Soviet years, the 
so-called “light” mentioned above. However, this does not excuse the Purge overall nor absolve 
the government of their wrongdoings.  
While not written for the sole purpose of being their official autobiographies, each of the 
memoirs I have highlighted are examples of this culture. Former Party members, Evgenia 
                                                      
35 Figes, 118.  
36 Hellbeck, Revolution, 2.  
37 Ibid., 24.  
Griffin 18 
Ginzburg, Victor Andreevich Kravchenko, and Anna Larina, provide the reader with the pressure 
and sense of fear that permeated throughout the Party ranks. Evgenia Ginzburg was a stalwart 
party member until she was implicated in participating in counter-revolutionary groups after 
Kirov’s assassination.38 She details her interrogations, her trial, imprisonment and exile in her 
memoir, struggling to come to terms with what has happened to not only her but other party 
members within the Soviet Union. Anna Larina was married to Nikolai Bukharin who was a 
high-ranking party member and victim of the 1937 show trials in Moscow.39 Because of her 
association, she was exiled, arrested, and sent to a work camp for 20 years. During her time in 
the Gulag, she learned of her husband’s assassination and was only released upon Stalin’s death 
in 1953. Victor Andreevich Kravchenko was lucky in the sense that he was not denounced or 
arrested before he defected in 1944.40 He was a Ukrainian-born party member and engineer. 
However, he became disillusioned with the Communist Party after witnessing the Ukrainian 
famine and the Great Terror. He documents the fear that existed even within the educated circles 
during the 1930s.  
The Terror also affected non-Party members, especially in campaigns targeting writers 
and the intelligentsia. Osip Mandelstam was a poet who was arrested in 1934.41 His wife, 
Nadezhda Mandelstam documents his four-year imprisonment and later death in a transit camp. 
She discusses the degradation of society after the 1920s and establishes her husband as a martyr 
of the system. Alexander Solzhenitsyn was a Soviet writer and outspoken critic of the Soviet 
                                                      
38 Evgenia Ginzburg,  Journey into the Whirlwind (San Diego: Harcourt, 1975). 
39 Anna Larina, This I Cannot Forget: The Memoirs of Nikolai Bukharin’s Widow, trans. Gary Kern (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1994).  
40 Victor Andreevich Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official (New 
York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1946). 
41 Nadezhda Mandelstam, Hope Against Hope: A Memoir, trans. Max Hayward, (New York: Atheneum, 1970). 
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government who was later punished for his critiques.42 In 1945, he was arrested and sentenced to 
eight years in a forced labor camp. His story takes place after the Terror, but his book, a mixture 
of memoir and interviews, has proven invaluable to understanding the Soviet penal system, the 
NKVD and its methods, and the camps throughout Siberia. All five of these writers were victims 
of this turbulent time period and, without their contribution to the memory of the Terror, many of 
the millions of victims would have been forgotten along with the Stalin’s crimes.  
Historical Precedents 
 Stalin and other officials did not create the Terror out of nothing. On the back of terror 
campaigns dating back to the Russian Revolutions and carried throughout the Civil War, the 
basis for the Purges were in place by 1934. Dekulakization began, wholeheartedly, in 1929.43 
The process of eliminating these ‘richer peasants’ was defined by deportation, arrests, and 
executions, often on the basis of limited evidence from other peasants. More campaigns in 1932 
against the criminal and marginal elements, especially in cities, also had extrajudicial 
proceedings and mass arrests. Both of these campaigns established a structure that would be used 
during the Purge and, specifically, the campaigns against national groups in 1937 and 1938. The 
disenfranchised as they became known were stripped of all “political and economic rights.”44 
Other targeted groups included traders, middlemen, priests and rabbis, the mentally ill, and 
anyone connected to the past tsarist regimes.45 The majority, however, were punished for 
economic transgressions as communism was more widely enforced.  
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 These campaigns also served other functions. They reinforced the categorization of 
disenfranchised groups and established a sense of fear. Many denounced others according to 
these groupings, even if previously denounced themselves for being of the same class, bolstering 
the government’s claim of the existence of political enemies.46 “The disenfranchised helped to 
perpetuate the policy that condemned them.” In addition to bolstering official policy, these 
denunciations continued to divide society into ever-smaller groupings based on increasingly-
specific criteria. This would only bring about more denunciations in the end. On creating fear, 
these campaigns were not revealed to the public.47 The public was aware of enemies but not of 
the mass round-ups and definitely not of the official operations behind them. As a result, citizens 
believed those arrested during these national campaigns were arraigned as wreckers and spies, 
only increasing fear and suspicion towards fellow citizens. If everyone arrested is an enemy, who 
is safe? Who can be trusted, besides the government?  
 By utilizing similar methods that had been used in the past, the CPSU was able to exploit 
past prejudices against prosperous peasants, landlords, managers, and minorities, to further their 
terror campaigns. People joined the call to rid society of those different from the average 
working class factory member or peasants, especially when they believed that they would be the 
leading group within the promised utopia. It also enabled the CPSU to continue campaigns 
against foreigners and other targets without drawing the ire from the citizenry. Many believed 
the arrests were done for national security reasons and, as a result, did not fight against the taking 
of neighbors or close friends. Some even joined in the campaign through denouncing these 
supposed enemies.  
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Loss of Religion 
 In this era, with the dissolution of the Russian Orthodox Church and other political 
parties, the Communist Party became exalted as a religion to some. Faith to the Party, even if 
excluding some leaders, was common in the aftermath of the Gulag experience.48 Religion is 
powerful, being noted by Marx as something to be avoided, and with the CPSU taking this 
position, they were able to influence behavior through the concept of sin, specifically 
punishment through expulsion and forced labor.49 Through punishment and by offering group 
membership and a perspective that could explain the problems of the world, the Communist 
Party became the religion of the land, boosted by official government policy.50 This faith is 
noteworthy because for some it was not shaken by the Gulag experience. For some, they saw 
themselves as the exception to the rule, the innocent among the guilty swept up in the Purge. 
“The claim that one is an exception presupposes an acceptance of the rule and effectively 
reassures the audience that the system in place is justified and does work.”51  
 The Party also became the path to opportunity and education during the 1920s and 1930s, 
causing many to join in its fight. The Communist Party provided opportunities to lower class 
workers and peasant farmers. These opportunities included social mobility, job offerings, higher 
wages, preferential housing, and other perks that seem almost like a form of salvation. The Party, 
in seeking members from modest backgrounds, were able to exploit the widespread poverty that 
existed in the Tsarist era and early Soviet period in recruitment.52 The members were usually 
more politically aware than the average citizen but, nevertheless, still connected to their roots, by 
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association with non-member family, friends, and co-workers. The two largest groups within the 
Soviet Union were workers and peasants, and the Party was smart for tapping into such a large 
resource. They were able to mobilize their forces and, through party meetings, were able to 
influence members’ behaviors.53 Each meeting brought new rules which were then passed on 
through members onto non-members until everyone followed the same tenets. Through this, the 
behavior of the masses was controlled indirectly but effectively.   
Through connections with non-members, the Communist Party was able to exert control 
over every member of society. However, this was easier with party members who were expected 
to base their entire lives around the ideals of the CPSU. “To the extent that the individual’s 
subsistence becomes reliant on the Communist Party, it is psychologically and politically too 
dangerous to criticize the Party. Supplication, felt or feigned, can be in the service of self-
interest.”54 With the Party controlling the monopoly of culture and social behaviors, even a non-
believer was influenced by their directives and shifts in official ideology. This influence 
combined with Stalin’s sudden ideological changes resulted in constant pressure to remain along 
the correct party line, whatever that happened to be that day. For party members, this pressure 
only increased ten-fold and party officials were always aware that a shift of ideology could be a 
shift in favor, resulting in show trials, forced labor, or execution for themselves and their 
families. While no one was safe from the threat of the Terror, conforming to Stalin’s vision of 
communism provided some safety, if only temporarily.   
Good standing within the Party was crucial for many aspects of life. This might explain 
the vast number of rehabilitation letters received by the Soviet government following Stalin’s 
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death. Upon release from the Gulag, even if proven innocent, reinstatement was not a 
guarantee.55 Many letters express support for the very system that imprisoned them. Many were 
forced to reconcile their thoughts and actions, and this cognitive dissonance, from personal 
experience versus official Party account, was difficult for many.56 But, in the end, reinstatement 
into the Party was preferred for victims of the Gulag. However, this loyalty was not widespread 
and many only wanted rehabilitation for the privileges being in good party standing brought: “If 
an ex-prisoner could receive rehabilitated status, with Party rehabilitation, the chances of a 
normal civil life, including material benefits, were much greater.”57 Rehabilitation, while beyond 
the scope of this paper, offers an important look into the mindset of those accused. Because those 
who were accused often overlapped with those who accused others, its shows the power of the 
Party within society, even after the return from the Gulag. 
Letter-Writing Culture 
 Denunciations are only a small part of the overall letter-writing culture that was present 
within the Soviet Union. Many within the Soviet Union wrote for a variety of reasons, ranging 
from complaints, appeals for help, denunciations, and confessions. This letter-writing culture 
was present since the days of the Tsar, explaining the widespread involvement from the citizens 
and its cultural legacy. These letters also provided insight into how the people viewed the Soviet 
Union and were used by the government as a way to gauge the public opinion.58 As a result, the 
government encouraged citizens to continue to write letters by responding to letters, either 
through aid or through investigations into allegations. This back-and-forth relationship between 
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the citizens and the government through letters was important during the Terror and provides 
context for denunciations overall.  
 The letters written before and during the Terror were plentiful and commonplace and sent 
to multiple official outlets or leaders within the Party. The letters sent to newspaper were rarely 
published and letters to officials dealt with problems both public and private. Newspapers 
processed citizens’ letters and passed them to the appropriate authorities, sometime even 
investigating the claim themselves.59 The reason for letters is based on tradition, where the 
authority figure, in this case Stalin, becomes a “beloved father” who wants to help his citizens.60 
Letters directed to this father-figure, dubbed victim letters, were mostly calls for assistance, 
usually surrounding the constant housing crises within the cities. In return, the government 
sometimes would help the victims in these letters, prompting more letter writing. “The degree 
and kind of response that could be expected from the authorities is obviously crucial to one’s 
understanding of the phenomenon of popular letter-writing.”61  
 Another genre of letters deals with critiques towards Stalin and his Party. Many letters 
were signed anonymous, a genre labeled anonimka, usually directing anger towards the 
government policies and perceived injustices about privileged classes.62 Some stressed their 
individuality in the face of official policy and wanted freedom through their letters.63 Other types 
of critiques were less forward and usually based on explaining one’s conviction to an official. 
These letters, classified as confession letters, were usually sincere confessions aimed at 
explaining their actions.64 These letters were primarily from women and show the importance of 
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the party in the minds of the people. Like a priest during the sacrament of reconciliation, citizens 
told the government of their faults in the hopes of receiving forgiveness for being forthcoming.  
 Denunciation letters were only a fraction of the letters received by Soviet officials. The 
attitudes towards denunciations are heavily influenced by the culture in which it exists.65 The 
public opinion on denunciations influenced how the citizens reacted to calls for denunciations, 
and while publicly they might be reviled, in private there was something to gain from 
denouncing others. Not all denunciations were entirely voluntary, with many being extracted 
during NKVD interrogations, which routinely involved torture and threats.66 There is also a 
distinction between formal denunciations, those done by informants to the secret police, and 
informal denunciations, the spontaneous revealing of law breaking, dissention, or political and 
social faults.67 This paper focuses primarily on informal denunciations not extracted during 
interrogations, showing why ordinary citizens suddenly denounce others without explicit 
pressure.  
While not being as severe as torture, the threat of punishment for many was enough to 
illicit denunciations. Article 58 of the RSFSR Penal Code, originally published in 1927 and 
amended six months before the death of Kirov in 1934, dealt with counterrevolutionary crimes, 
which ranged from suspected sabotage to treason. This article is important for its specific call for 
denunciations. Article 58-1 specifies that “Failure by a military member to denounce 
preparations or the carrying-out of treason shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for 10 
years.”68 For non-military citizens, the same crime “shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty 
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for a term not less than six months,” according to Article 58-12.69 With the threat of punishment, 
many were prompted to join the NKVD in the search for enemies and to denounce those around 
them, at least in the hopes of protecting themselves.  
 Motives behind denunciation include patriotism and loyalty towards one’s country, 
concern about enemies and criminals, fear of punishment, or personal interest. “Letters were 
written to solve problems, resolve disputes and settle scores. People wrote in a spirit of duty, 
malice, ambition, loneliness, despair.”70 In these letters, a common theme was the presentation of 
the denouncer being a loyalty communist and a victim and the denounced being an exploiter or 
enemy. Many called upon specific stereotypes, like being a peasant, a widow, uneducated,71 and 
presented their enemy using their prejudices against managers and kulaks and other ethnic 
groups.72 Many cited civic duty to the state in order to prevent accusations of personal interest, 
though, “Frequently their motives were mixed, and personal interests could play a significant 
role in citizens’ decisions to turn in friends, neighbors, and even relatives.”73 Denunciations 
against close relatives, including the parents of those in youth groups, was considered a civic 
duty to the nation, though denunciation was too common for individuals to receive praise.74  
 For the secret police, denunciation letters proved invaluable. This was no different for the 
government, who was clear in their calls for denunciations. The issue of denunciations thus 
becomes one revolving around what it means to be a citizen. “Exploring the core of citizens’ 
commitment of loyalty to the state and their (perhaps incompatible) commitment of solidarity 
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with their fellow citizens.”75 Denunciation becomes expected for any loyal citizen and one must 
prove their loyalty through denunciation. This was not universal but the Terror could not have 
happened on such a wide scale without citizen participation. Members of the Party felt obligated 
to denounce other members for even minor offenses.76  
 Denunciation became a staple within the Soviet legal system, where verdicts and 
resolutions were not guaranteed.77 Denunciations became essential to the governance of the 
country during the 1930s, becoming primarily a bureaucratic problem and a moral problem 
second. Thus the problem of morality surrounding denunciations became based on how close the 
denounced and denouncer were. Denunciations against family and friends was considered 
morally evil, but this was not common when bosses and managers were concerned. This line 
shows that while public opinion on denunciations were predominately negative, there were also 
situations where denunciations was seen as a good thing, complicating the matter of determining 
why denunciations flourished.  
Denunciation was also seen as a way to guarantee loyalty, especially from NKVD 
officers, and became a primary method of control within the government. The government is, 
“particularly likely to encourage their citizens or members to write denunciations against each 
other for purposes of maintaining social control, ideological purity, virtue, and so on.”78 As a 
result, denunciations were sometimes written preemptively to protect against being denounced. 
With this, the government and secret police were able to extend their sphere of influence and 
control over society. Without denunciations, the Terror, most likely, would have ended with the 
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1936 and 1937 show trials, and affected only government officials and Party members, instead of 
the millions that became entangled in its web. 
Fear Mongering and Propaganda 
The Terror is aptly named for its most visible symptom: widespread mass hysteria across 
all levels of Soviet society.79 The Soviet government was the hardest hit by mass hysteria while 
also propagating its spread. Government and Party officials were directly responsible for creating 
a sense of fear and insecurity within the population, aided by inconsistent ideology, widespread 
cultural and social control, and propaganda calling for the liquidation of saboteurs and double-
dealers. At the same time, Party officials were also affected by the fear of being denounced and a 
shift of favor along with the ever-changing ideology. This puts the government into a precarious 
situation that reinforces Stalin’s orders and authority. To avoid being purged, officials followed 
Stalin’s arbitrary and, sometimes, contradictory ideas, and defined the lives of millions within 
the Soviet borders. This fear eventually spread downwards and out, affecting the average citizens 
under Communist control. “Thus there were spies upon the spies in an intricate pattern that 
spread a tangible pull of fear.”80 
Indoctrination 
Communism, especially under Stalin, had striking similarities and differences when 
compared to other totalitarian regimes during the 20th century, such as Nazi Germany and 
Communist China. According to C. W. Cassinelli’s, a political scientist writing during the height 
of the Cold War, most totalitarian regimes do not have a concrete doctrine, resulting in 
“contradictory and arbitrary ‘ideological’ practices.”81 He proposes that, under Stalin’s rule, this 
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inconsistent rhetoric was intentional to foster insecurity within the masses and the Party ranks. 
With members of the Party seeing Stalin as infallible under his cult of personality, similar to the 
Roman Catholic Pope, Stalin becomes the leader of a quasi-religious ideology that is based on 
his word alone.82 In his pursuits, he emphasized ideas he agreed with and concealed or outright 
banned ideas that were dissatisfactory, contrary to his beliefs, or foreign.83 While this had little 
direct effect on the masses, it greatly affected the rank-and-file Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union members. “The faithful party member never makes independent appraisals of the conduct 
of the party, since he possesses no definite criteria as to the content of the ultimate society or 
directions as to how to get there.”84 
Without a concrete doctrine, training of party members and their relatives was difficult to 
achieve without the use of fear and the dissolution of personal relationships. “Moreover, it is 
most significant that when the Communists train their real activists, they do not concern 
themselves with ‘ideological’ matters. Obedience and ruthlessness based upon the complete 
severing of all normal human intercourse is the goal.”85 The Communist Party indoctrinated its 
rank-and-file members through fear and vague promises of utopia, doing away with a concrete 
doctrine and consistent ideology. Anything that would bring about utopia was considered along 
the party line. Without having a set doctrine, the Party was able to adjust its policies and ideals 
without reason. They were able to extract loyalty by changing what was considered normal 
social behavior, causing relationships to disintegrate and causing society to become fractioned 
and insecure. Without a strong support system, the average person was especially sensitive to the 
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changes of the Party, even if not a member, and more easily manipulated into following the 
Party’s, i.e. Stalin’s, ideals.  
Totalitarian states were successful in indoctrination because of their control of all aspects 
of life. This social and psychological control meant that dissent was not only banned but almost 
impossible to carry out. By breaking down support systems, people were isolated and more likely 
to agree to and follow the Party, even if they knew they it was wrong. Everyone’s life, thoughts, 
actions, and relationships are scrutinized and any moment of weakness or apprehension is 
exploited. Anyone not willing to show their support was at risk of being arrested, interrogated, 
and executed. This vulnerability affected not only party members but also the average citizens 
within factories or working on communes. 
Even without a set doctrine, the Party set out to control “all vital aspects of man’s 
existence.”86 Everything done within the Soviet Union had to not only be along the Party line but 
should also benefit the Party in its mission towards utopia. This ranged from everyday actions 
and thoughts to the problem of hardships within this, supposedly, superior society. Hardships and 
the maintenance of loyalty became the pillar of the ideal Soviet Man. Stalin in his early days 
wanted to be a Marxist theorist and this is seen in his obsession with the ever-changing doctrine 
of the Soviet Union and the new ideals set forth, such as socialism in one country, the Five Year 
Plans, and the removal of old Tsarist and Bolshevik frameworks. To fit his new ideal, he 
promoted Lenin while also changing the very structures Lenin established to create a global 
powerhouse, isolated from the capitalistic world. He promoted whatever would solidify his 
power and increase the control the Party has over society.  
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The Party, in fostering a widespread sense of fear, offered security through conformity 
and trust. While this did not affect everyone equally, this is an important shift for some and helps 
explain the fanaticism and willingness to denounce or renounce personal relationships seen in 
some individuals during Stalin’s rule. If everyone outside, and some within, the Soviet Union are 
an enemy, then the only group you can trust becomes the government and the officials in charge, 
who become the sole protector of the nation. However this protection was based on loyalty and 
the meeting of expectations, causing many to change their personal behaviors to fit the new ideal 
of the day. “Of course, it was one thing to order reforms, quite another to enforce them. Stalin 
was right in his charge that the leaders feared the truth. They feared it because truth was an 
almost always counter-revolutionary and always dangerous luxury.”87   
For others, conformity was a feigned response to the pressures from the state. In public 
they were just as communist as everyone else, but in private they were critical of the government 
and longed for a different way of life. However, any critique of the government or show of 
discontent was strictly prohibited under the rules of the Terror. The threat of execution or forced 
labor, or in extreme cases, the interrogation and torturing of relatives, was enough to keep most 
people in line. This was not only limited to those within the Party ranks but the average citizen as 
well. When you do not know who is listening and what they might do, it is better to remain silent 
and hope for better days.  
However, loyalty was not always a guarantee of safety. For so-called kulaks, landlords, 
and members targeted during the national campaigns, orthodoxy to the Party line was not enough 
to overcome what the Soviet government saw as impurities and signs of being enemies.88 Even 
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the most devout communists were under the constant threat of liquidation. This precedence was 
set during the early years of Stalin’s reign when national campaigns against foreigners were 
rampant and dekulakization and collectivization was in full swing.89 “It is not the dissenter but 
the ‘political enemy’ to whom the terror is applied. When the kulaks have been eliminated, their 
place is taken by national minorities, and the terror continues as before.”90 This cycle endured 
until the end of the Terror in 1938, but its effects and attitudes lasted well after World War II and 
into the 1950s.        
The Soviets managed to create a closed system where outside information was filtered 
through them and their ideas were the only ones allowed.91 In doing this, they created a system 
where conformity was not only expected but seen as the only option. With this, some members 
of Soviet society adopted the Communist Party’s ideals as strongly as their own. This was only 
exacerbated by time spent in the Gulag, as some blamed themselves for the Party’s misguided 
actions and believed the allegation against them were true, or at least, partially their doing. 
Without outside ideas or a real view of the Western world, people were at the mercy of the 
Communist Party and the image they put forth. It is easier for a government to indoctrinate their 
people if citizens are only allowed to know what the government wants them to know. They are 
able to continue the narrative that the Western world wants to destroy the Soviet Union and its 
people, only continuing the fear that permeated society and convincing many to join in the fight 
against these external, and internal, enemies.  
The 1930s was also the time of the Great Depression for the West, something the Soviet 
Union pointed to as a symptom of the problems with capitalism and the beginning of the end for 
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the capitalist world.92 By using this low point, Stalin was able to drive home the differences 
between the Soviet Union and the West and show the strength of the Communist system, 
according to the Party. This only served to create “greater antagonism” between capitalism and 
communism, especially within industrial communities. As opposed to the unemployment and 
stresses of the Great Depression, the Soviet Union could boast having low unemployment with 
basic amenities provided, even if these promises were not true, or equal, in practice. Through the 
promises of establishing a communist utopia, the CPSU was able to convince workers that 
everything they did was for the betterment of the future and any hardships were noble in this 
endeavor. This, compared to the plights of the capitalistic world of the 1930s, was preferred by 
many within the borders of the Soviet Union. “In brief, Communism is the realization of all 
man’s most noble ideals.”93  
 Other remarks on the Western world at the time focused solely on their constant 
threatening of the Soviet Union and their goals. Marxist belief, while saying nothing on how a 
government should rule, does specify that in the class-less utopia, there is no need for 
government. Stalin’s justification for the continuation of his totalitarian regime was that “the 
state could not wither away as long as capitalist states ‘encircled’ the Soviet Union.”94 With the 
use of threatening language, Stalin was not only able to justify his regime but also exacerbate the 
fear within the general populace concerning the outside world. He also promised that after the 
‘encirclement’ ended, all of the hardships plaguing society would disappear.95 With the promise 
to an end to the Terror, and denunciation, and poor living conditions, and forced loss of property 
and other restrictive measures, the people were more likely to act upon these calls and do the 
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bidding for the Party. This only added to the noble call of communism and the willingness to 
participate under the CPSU. 
 While totalitarian regimes controlled every part of a person’s life, the average citizen is 
not absolved of their crimes. Through nonaction, totalitarian regimes are able to thrive and 
remain in power. Totalitarian regimes could only continue if “the masses of the population 
remained politically neutral and passive.”96 This quote was said by Zbigniew Brzezinski, a 
Polish-American diplomat and the National Security Advisor under President Carter. He had 
done countless research on the Soviet system. However, this idea is challenged by the changes 
that affected Soviet society during this time, including industrialization, increased literacy, and 
the Stalinist ideals of nationalism and superiority. To maintain influence as the only ideology, the 
Soviets controlled art, science, and history taught within the standardized education system and 
in higher education.97 This included the “proletarianization” of art, where art was determined by 
its usefulness in propagating the official agenda, not its content.98  
History was focused on the superiority of the Soviet state and science only focused on 
Soviet discoveries, doing away with any foreign concepts, including DNA and fields of 
linguistics.99 Stalin’s personal interest in the historical importance of Russia, including the 
Byzantine tradition and the concept of Holy Russia influenced the official history of the Soviet 
Union. With this, Stalin was able to control how the masses thought about art, history, and 
science, while also promoting the dominance of the Soviet Union and its Russian foundation. 
Again, with the control of all information, the CPSU was able to make the general populace 
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dependent on its ideals and perspective and make them sensitive to the requests of the 
government, including the writing of denunciations.  
Another form of propaganda was created to convince the Soviet subjects of their exalted 
position within this budding Communist utopia. “The Soviet system is said to provide a life full 
of joy and plenty, with no unemployment and with the world’s lowest rent and most advanced 
social insurance, all thanks to Comrade Stalin himself.”100 By promising a class-less society with 
opportunities from standardized education, industrialization, increased food production, and the 
increased standard of living for some with modernization, the Soviet Union was able to exploit 
the positives of the party to influence the people. Some clung to these improvements as evidence 
that the Party was successful in its endeavors and that their sacrifice meant something, that their 
suffering was not in vain.               
 Stalin, while Georgian, was very pro-Russian and stressed the importance of Russia to 
world history. “The role of Russia and the Russian has been stressed because, by stating that all 
important past events had occurred within the area currently controlled by Stalin.”101 By calling 
upon the past, Stalin is able to justify the legitimacy of the Soviet Union and showing the Soviet 
Union as the next stage of global development. This sets up his regime as the future and sets up 
basic education as a form of conversion or indoctrination. The Soviet Union and communist 
ideology just become the next stage in Russian domination and the utopia becomes a promise, 
given Russia’s past importance within religion and history. “To the totalitarian, ideas are 
weapons; by constructing an iron curtain he insures the monopoly of his own.”102  
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 Without a concrete doctrine, the Party was subject to changes in official ideals under 
Stalin without provocation or explanation. “The famous purges of Soviet activists are often based 
upon ‘opposition to the correct party line;’ the very arbitrariness of the line makes the purges 
more devastating.”103 With a constantly shifting ideology along the lines of one man’s personal 
ambitions, many were caught having acted against party ideals without having actively opposing 
the Party. With this, fear and uncertainty plagued the minds of those living under this regime. 
Without any other information except what was given by party, people were hopeless to fight the 
influence of ideology and the indoctrination of the masses. Party members and average citizens, 
alike, were under the control of one man, Josef Stalin, whose ideals and plans changed without 
warning nor reason.  
Enemies and Double-Dealers                                                                             
 Terror-era denunciations came from many sources. However one of the most important 
were denunciations sent to government officials and the NKVD exposing enemies of the 
Communist state, including class enemies, capitalist exploiters, and saboteurs.104 Many citizens 
reacted to the official Soviet announcements with fear and insecurity and acted upon the 
government’s call. As a result, those who were denounced were deprived of their rights, a 
common aftermath of denunciation, and sent away for hard labor or just executed without 
prejudice. The government, knowing the perpetuation of a group of enemies would only prompt 
more denunciations, started a campaign of propaganda to continue its control. This propaganda, 
aimed at indoctrination and the creation of fear, was successful in the latter but questionable in 
the former.105  
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 In a speech given at the Plenum of the Central Committee on March 3, 1937, Stalin called 
out Party members for carelessness when dealing with the issue of enemies and double-dealers. 
He recalled the death of Kirov: “first serious warning which indicated that enemies of the people 
would resort to double-dealing and that they would mask themselves as Bolsheviks, as Party 
members, in order to worm their way into our confidence and to thus open access for themselves 
into our organizations.”106 He claims that Party officials and members were impressed by the 
economic successes of the Soviet Union, and thus, disregarded the war the Bolsheviks were still 
under from internal and external sources. With the Soviet Union only encompassing one-sixth of 
the world, the nation was sensitive to problems with the capitalist encirclement, “Is it not clear 
that for as long as we have capitalist encirclement, we shall have wreckers, spies, diversionists, 
and killers sent to our rear by agents of foreign states?” He also details how the Trotskyites from 
the 1930s are not the same as the ones from the 1920s, usually more subverted and concealing 
their platforms for fear of reprisal. Without acknowledging this difference, the Communist Party 
was not able to fight these enemies successfully, leading to spies.  
 This speech, while detailing the, alleged, issues of the Soviet Union with enemies, 
provides good background on Stalin’s thoughts during this time. By making such a speech at an 
important conference for the party, Stalin not only called upon fellow members and officials to 
act, but also was able to intensify the fear that many felt. One mistake, one association, was the 
only thing between an official and exile, forced labor, or even death. This fear only spiraled 
downward and Stalin’s continued references to these enemies convinced many that they were 
real and everywhere within the Soviet Union. Many believed that any dissenting opinion or 
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action was evidence of that person’s association with enemies, leading some to become paranoid 
and believe that subversive and destructive behavior was imminent.  
End of Personal Relationships 
 This propaganda also ruined the personal relationships maintained throughout the Soviet 
Union. With the ever-growing reliance on terror, people were forced to adapt by changing their 
views on their fellow countrymen, no matter their previous relationships. “The growing dread of 
personal vulnerability produced a pervasive mistrust of others. People developed twisted, often 
aggressive strategies for self-protection. The poisonous atmosphere seeped into even the closest 
and most private of human relationships.”107 Again, the destruction of a personal support base 
makes the populace more vulnerable to the influence of the Party. With this, denunciation against 
even a close family member in the hopes of protection become a means to an end. Stalin, in his 
mission to establish complete control, used this uncertainty and the rising social tensions to his 
benefit, only spreading the effects of the Terror further into the minds and lives of the average 
citizen.108   
 The issue of emotions and relationships was a difficult and sensitive subject during the 
Terror. With many desperate to protect themselves from the fate of those around them, they 
denounced or were compliant in the arrests, destroying the very same bonds they relied on. In her 
memoir Hope Against Hope chronicling her experiences after her husband was arrested for anti-
Stalinist poetry and sentenced to internal exile, Nadezhda Mandelstam laments the effects of 
denunciation and associations, even before being arrested. “It was always painful when 
somebody one had become friendly with mysteriously broke off relations, but this, alas, was the 
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only thing that honorable people could do if they refused to play the role of an ‘adjutant.’”109 She 
is very aware of what could happen if one associates with someone who is later implicated 
during the Terror. She spends many nights awake, afraid for her colleagues and friends. She 
wonders if they have been arrested and if so, what tortures await them at the hands of the 
interrogators.110 While her story is not the typical case within the Soviet Union, being educated 
and associating with other literary elites, her writings provide insight into the effects of fear on 
personal relationships and how few options were provided. Mandelstam lost her husband while 
in transit to a Gulag labor camp, escaping the fate of many during this era but only through 
death.  
 Kravchenko mirrors these concerns in his memoir, I Chose Freedom. He laments about 
the effects the Terror had on his relationships, especially as the Terror grew: “From this time 
forward it became a matter of ‘honor’ to denounce and expose ‘disguised enemies’ in the Party. 
You hesitated to talk to your closest comrades. You disassociated yourself from friends and 
relatives and colleagues. What if they were infected, germ-bearers of the political epidemic 
sweeping the land?”111 He acknowledges the issue of association and the solution. He talks about 
how brotherhood is not enough to overcome the pressures from above, nor the response from 
below. How pressures built until the basic bonds within the factory, the neighborhood, the family 
were destroyed by the eminent explosion, marked by denunciations and arrests.  
The Gulag System 
 The Gulag and its effects cannot be ignored when talking about the Terror. The Gulag is 
responsible for furthering indoctrination even long after the end of the Terror and has become 
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linked with the Terror, especially after Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s book was published in 1974. 
Nanci Adler makes a case for the adoption of Soviet ideals by the general populace as a 
symptom of the Terror, especially for those who served sentences. She states that they develop a 
form of Stockholm Syndrome to deal with the pressures and fatigues of forced labor.112 “Fear is 
accompanied by the elevation of stress hormones, motivating people who are in a stressful 
situation to forge rapid, strong, and sometimes permanent, attachment bonds to relieve the 
neurobiological stress.”113 Because they have adopted the ideals of their oppressors, they blame 
themselves for their plights and seek reconciliation from the Party about their perceived 
transgressions. Because of this, the stress of the forced labor camps stays with the victims long 
after their release in 1953 and the end of the Terror.114 This continues throughout their lives and 
for many within the Soviet Union, the threat of the being under the Gulag system keeps them 
within Party line long after Stalin’s death.  
 Solzhenitsyn wrote about the pervasive fear within the prisons. “The convicted prisoner 
had to learn that his worst guilt out in freedom had been his attempt somehow to get together or 
unite with others by any route…In prison this fear went so far as to become fear of all kinds of 
collective action: two voices uttering the same complaint or two prisoners signing a complaint on 
one piece of paper.”115 Prisoners were unable to rely on each other for fear of retaliation, for fear 
of punishment, for fear of conditions only worsening within the camps. The collective that was 
so expounded upon by the Communist Party was broken within the camps, rendering the Gulag 
its own little world within the Soviet Union, untouched by the ideals of the rest of the nation.  
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 The Gulag served as a pervasive threat within the Soviet system, and many who knew of 
its existence were hellbent on remaining on the right side of Soviet opinion in order to avoid 
being imprisoned, no matter the costs. Forced labor was seen as a form of reconciliation, of 
repentance for past crimes. But if one is able to act in accordance with the Party, including in the 
writing of denunciations and by aiding in the Terror, then repentance is not needed and the Gulag 
can remain a distance threat rather than one’s home and personal hell.  
Aftermath: “Silence is the real crime against humanity”116  
 The Terror ended in early 1938. In a letter titled “On the Final Victory of Socialism in the 
U.S.S.R” to the staff propagandist of the Manturovsk District, Josef Stalin declares that they, 
“succeeded in liquidating our bourgeoisie, in establishing fraternal collaboration with our 
peasantry and in building.”117 With this, the Terror of the 1930s was over. However, despite the 
end date of 1938, the effects of the Terror continued, with many people implicated, arrested, and 
killed for supposed crimes without justification and without due process until 1953. The fear still 
survived within the average citizen and millions were forced to readapt into the world after the 
Terror.  
Denunciations during the Terror were not only limited to supposed enemies and other 
official targets, entangling many throughout the Soviet Union. The web even managed to 
entangle those who had denounced previously.118 Many who denounced were later denounced 
themselves, even with most of those who were denounced being innocent. Many played an active 
role in continuing the oppressive regime that later turned on them and punished them like they 
had before. Some were conflicted about this turn of events, wondering what they had done to 
                                                      
116 Mandelstam, 43.  
117 J.V. Stalin, "On the Final Victory of Socialism in the U.S.S.R." Marxist Internet Archive, 2008, accessed 
February 2, 2019,  https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1938/01/18.htm. 
118 Adler, 214.  
Griffin 42 
deserve this treatment. However, others believed they were an error within the system, an error 
which was justifiable for all of the ‘conspirators’ caught during the process. This belief also 
relates to the teachings from the party on the importance of hardships in the process of obtaining 
utopia.  
This issue of justification was prominent in the later years of the Soviet Union. 
Mandelstam writes, “Every new killing was excused on the grounds that we were building a 
remarkable ‘new’ world in which there would be no more violence, and that no sacrifice was too 
great for it. Nobody noticed that the end had begun to justify the means, and then, as always, 
gradually been lost sight of.”119 No resistance or push back led many to see the actions of the 
government as a necessary evil and some even justified the horrors they witnessed by calling 
upon the promised utopia. With this, the aftermath of the Terror becomes focused on the gradual 
amnesia that has plagued the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation today. Many have come 
to see the Soviet Union as a high point and Stalin as the strong leader needed in a time of 
discontent and disorder.  
The Terror has never been ‘claimed’ in Russia. Few have admitted fault and even more 
have passed the responsibility onto someone else.120 Despite evidence to the contrary, the Party 
denies their actions and the masterminds behind the plan either died without having to directly 
accept their responsibility or were able to use the totalitarian regime to their benefit. This is true 
even in modern-day Russia, where memories of the Terror are repressed and the lessons of the 
1930s are lost to history.121 For Gulag prisoners, “their survival is necessarily the cumulative 
consequence of how their physical and mental abilities coped with and adapted to the 
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repression.”122 But even their actions and behaviors were influenced by the attitudes of the nation 
that has never shied away from changing history for its benefit, denying them the peace that 
suffered for.  
 In 1953, many of those placed into the camps under Stalin were released. A commission 
was sent in the early months of Khrushchev’s tenure to the camps to investigate the penal 
system.123 Many believed the CPSU would acknowledge the atrocities committed, but instead 
offered forgiveness to victims for crimes they were only accused of. Some were offered 
rehabilitation, but for many, rehabilitation and reinstatement would be life-long processes, 
sometimes only completed after the fall of Communism in 1991. Along with this, many petitions 
for reinstatement and rehabilitation focused on proving innocence through the denunciation of 
others, only continuing this cycle.  
 There is a lot of difficulty in attempting to understand the mindset of the Terror from 
memoirs, as memoirs are few and far in between. The average citizen was quick to repress their 
feelings and memories on the Terror while those affected by the Gulags number in the 
millions.124 Those who wrote memoirs were usually highly-educated, prominent members of 
society before the Terror, and some were ardent followers of communism. However, with the 
number of letters calling for rehabilitation, a restoration of once-deprived rights, and 
reinstatement within the Party, some judgement on the victims’ mindset can be made. After 
Stalin’s death, many applied for rehabilitation, and many were able to receive this status.125 The 
question becomes how can people victimized by their government, the very government 
responsible for their imprisonment, remain loyal to the party and ask for rehabilitation?  
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For others, rehabilitation was not enough. They petitioned for reinstatement into the Party 
ranks, a bestowed position not automatically regained upon rehabilitation. For many, this process 
was about gaining or regaining the benefits membership gave. With reinstatement, time spent in 
the camps and fighting for reinstatement were added to one’s tenure within the Party.126 
Membership, especially long-term, “offered instrumental social advantages for housing, job 
placement and professional advancement.”127 Those who applied for reinstatement hoped 
professing loyalty and acting within line would promise a normal live after the Gulag, something 
desperately needed. Rehabilitation and reinstatement were not uniform and victim’s willingness 
to reengage with their oppressors has been seen as a testament to the strength of the Communist 
Party.128  
 The petitioning to be reinstated into the party and to be rehabilitated into society was 
especially common in the countryside where dekulakization had many deprived of their rights.129 
In this process, many proclaimed their innocence through letters written to the CPSU where they 
portrayed themselves as victims of exploitation, the same thing they were accused of. “Petition 
writers also described how they, illiterate and incapable, were unable to ‘set themselves up’ 
under the new order.”130 Their denunciations called upon the policies and language established 
by the CPSU and established themselves as the party’s ideal and their victim as the true enemy. 
 The CPSU was successful in the countryside through the use of already-present 
prejudices, only exacerbated by the campaigns towards dekulakization and collectivization 
where many were suddenly targeted. Golfo Alexopoulos argues that in these letters, denunciation 
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was not required but was a regular occurrence. He questions whether this strategy was an attempt 
for one to define their social identity in the polarized world of the Soviet Union.131 As a result, 
victim talk, when one tries to portray oneself as the victim, was a common feature of society on 
all levels, including within the Soviet leadership about their so-called enemies.132 By using the 
rhetoric put forth by the party, citizens were able to make themselves into the ideal Soviet 
person, including being victims of exploitation and struggle during the petition and reinstatement 
process. They reinvented themselves and carved their own part within this system, showing how 
easy it is for someone who was a victim to turn the page and victimize those around them. In 
doing so, “the disenfranchised helped to perpetuate the policy that condemned them.”133   
 Dynamics were similar within the city but focused on the life within the factories. By 
using factory newspapers, Wendy Goldman was able to show the fear and desperation necessary 
to bring someone to denounce another.134 She also touches upon the perpetuating cycle of 
denunciations. One denunciation has a domino effect, affecting everyone that knows the 
denounced but also aggravating the fear and suspicion many felt towards their friends and 
families. “‘True believers,’ eager at first to aid the Party in its hunt for internal enemies, wrestled 
with growing doubts at coworkers, bosses, parents, siblings, friends, and neighbors disappeared 
into prisons.”135 The action of denouncing was not only limited to letters to the government, but 
also those who wrote defamatory articles within the factory and those who pressured managers to 
expel enemies. In this mostly closed-system, relationships were strained and many were accused 
of wrecking, especially during public meetings.  
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 In the beginning, some trusted the NKVD to investigate their claims and restore 
justice.136 However, as the Terror only grew worse, this trust of the secret police was eroded and 
many became aware of their vulnerability and impurity. An inkling of doubt about the Party and 
its actions and its victims caused some to rethink what the government was considering an 
enemy. When any personal connection to the denounced or imperfection within one’s biography 
can be used against them, hopelessness sets in. Some feel compelled to follow the Party’s will in 
the hopes of protecting themselves and others become resigned to their fates, but in the end, the 
Terror scars everyone it touches and is felt for decades after its official end.  
 The period of the Terror was marked by changes in how the average citizen viewed the 
Party. Some were convinced that Stalin was responsible, so with the next general secretary, 
problems would be solved. However, with the beginning of Nikita Khrushchev’s regime in 1953, 
hopes were dashed when the man who denounced Stalin’s crimes continued to exercise the 
centralization of control within the empire.137As a result, the reprieve from Terror did not last 
long and the mindset of persecution, fear, and forced loyalty only continued.  
This loyalty was not widespread. Many remained distrustful or resentful of the CPSU 
until they died and it is difficult to imagine what the thoughts of the millions who died within the 
labor camps would be.138 Many saw themselves as an expendable slave labor within the larger 
issues of industrialization and modernization of small villages and parts of Siberia. This is 
contrasted with those who did not lose faith in the mission of the CPSU, even if they lost faith in 
Stalin as a leader. Some advocated for lost parents or spouses just for a sake of justice.139 In the 
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end, “tens of thousands were to apply for and receive rehabilitation,” and while this did nothing 
to undo the injustice, for some it was enough.140   
 So back to the question of why loyalty persisted within some individuals. On this topic, 
Nanci Adler, in her interviews with workers from that era, noted many were proud of the work 
they did in modernizing and building cities, some of which helped in the war effort.141 They 
became the foundation of socialism in these parts and, if they chose to remain in these isolated 
towns, were exalted for their efforts. While they might not agree with the methods that the CPSU 
took, they still believed in the end goal: class-less utopia. They saw their imprisonment as 
supporting the ideology in its mission, a noble perspective to take on such a harrowing 
experience. Adler also proposes that, once again, the Party has taken up a religious aspect: “If the 
Gulag experience is perceived as brutalized forced labour, it is repression. If it is perceived as a 
‘labour of love,’ if veers in the direction of devotion. The redeeming value of religious suffering, 
even martyrdom, comes to mind.”142  
 For many, the effects of the Terror still reign. Private life was obliterated, personal 
relationships were strained or ruined, fear was still a daily reminder of the past, and the belief in 
utopia never came. Wendy Goldman called a consequence of the Terror “dual-mindedness,” 
where one was forced to split public loyalty and private discontent.143 This dealt with the issues 
of coming to terms with denouncing others while trying to protect family and friends, agreeing 
with the Party in actions but not in thought, feigning security in the face of vulnerability. What 
someone said in public was not necessarily what they believed, creating a disconnect in some 
people, aggravated by the continuation of fear, even after 1938. 
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 Over five million victims returned to Soviet society, a number which does not include 
exiles and deportees. These numbers are also complicated by the 1937 census. The data for the 
1937 census was repressed when the extent of the 1932-1933 Famine and the Terror was 
shown.144“In 1936, the official estimate of the total USSR population at the beginning of 1933 
(based on the 1926 census and ZAGS data about births, emigration and deaths) was 165.7 
million. The 1937 census figure, however, was only 162 million.”145 This was a problem for the 
Soviet Union who intended to use this data for propagandistic purposes. While the real number 
of victims will never be known for certain, the census taken at the height of the Terror provides 
some insight into the destruction of the 1930s.  
The CPSU had to toe a precarious line between the indoctrination and terror. When 
indoctrination failed, terror becomes the only option. “It is the party and the ideology together 
that provide the system with its inbuilt momentum. The decline of either would force the regime 
to rely almost exclusively on terror, as Stalin did, or face the prospect of far-reaching 
transformation of the system.”146 With the onset of the Terror in 1934, the strains of Stalin’s 
totalitarian regime were beginning to show. However, some have pondered whether this reign of 
terror is just another stage within the system of trying to create a new order within the Soviet 
Union, including modernizing a traditional and, overall, uneducated society into a global 
powerhouse.147 While this has been debated, it is clear that Stalin had a direct impact on the 
actions of the thirties. Stalin, aware of the discontent that beginning to rise, used the Terror as a 
social safety-valve, halting people’s thoughts and actions on acting against the government. 
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However, with this method, the terror becomes cyclical, making many wonder if terror is the 
only way to prevent tensions from spilling out while also contributing to this tension?  
Conclusion 
After Stalin’s death in 1953, 1.2 million Gulag prisoners were liberated.148 However, this 
does not account for the great numbers still within the camps or the problem of how the 
government should deal with the aftermath of Stalinism and the subsequent Terror. The release 
of the prisoners could be seen as a form of amnesty performed by the government without 
directly condemning the actions of the Party. Prisoners were forgiven for crimes they had not 
committed, for allegations that were unfounded, for being part of something bigger than 
themselves involuntarily, without the promise of rehabilitation.149 This continues the 
victimization of Gulag prisoners while absolving the Party of any transgressions and mistakes. 
With Stalin’s death, for many, the Terror was not over. 
 The Terror and its widespread effects are shown in the pervasive fear still felt within the 
Russian Federation. The government still has a strong hold on the citizenry within Russia, 
continuing the cycle proposed by Brzezinski of terror being a necessary part in consolidating 
power. Whether something like the Terror will happen again in modern-day Russia has yet to be 
seen, but the beginnings are there, in official government policy, in fear-mongering, and in 
censorship and propaganda. However, this paper has shown that while the government is 
responsible for fostering this environment, it is those who willing denounced others, exploit this 
fear, and call for punishment that are responsible. It is easy, with pressure coming from all sides 
to conform to ideals that challenge one’s morality, to go against social norms, and become 
                                                      
148 Adler, 224.  
149 Ibid., 225.  
Griffin 50 
involved in something bigger than one can imagine, but it is not impossible to resist, even 
silently. 
 It is this willingness to conform in the face of fear that makes the Terror and 
denunciations overall so important. It was seen during: the Salem Witch Trials, where people 
were executed for just an accusation of witchcraft; McCarthyism, where members of the public 
were blacklisted for even suspected sympathies to the Communists; and is still seen today in the 
era of social media, doxing, and people and companies being “cancelled” for anything, including 
misunderstandings. While the court of public opinion is not as forceful and punishing as a 
government effort, the court of public opinion still has a major influence on one’s daily life, and 
if one finds themselves on the wrong side of this line, it is very difficult to overcome and return 
to society untainted. Denunciation exists in cultures all over the world and has only become 
easier to issue with the access to the Internet and easier to enforce through the rapid spread of 
information.  However, most would not see their actions as denunciation, which makes it all the 
more terrifying.  
 While another example like the Terror will, hopefully, never happen on this scale again, 
the issue of denunciation and its effects are important as technology makes communication and 
spreading of information quicker and easier. This argument is significant because it shows how 
easily a society can devolve into fear and how quickly denunciations can spread and wreak 
havoc. From learning from the Soviet example, one can see the beginnings and combat 
misinformation, propaganda, and fear. However, it is difficult to pin down why people denounce, 
and, as stated previously, there are many reasons, including patriotism and self-interest. This 
makes the act of denouncing difficult to fully understand and prevent. Without learning about 
this shameful moment of history, one cannot hope to prevent another Terror from taking place. 
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